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Abstract 
We model an economy where imperfectly competitive firms choose whether 
to employ a dirty technology and pay an emission tax or employ a clean 
technology and incur the cost of its adoption. Bureaucrats who are entrusted 
with the task of monitoring the emissions of each firm, are corruptible in the 
sense that they may accept bribes in order to mislead authorities on the firms’ 
actual emissions. Market entry is an important element in the relation between 
corruption and pollution. Particularly, the incidence of corruption increases the 
number of entrants in the market, while the bureaucrats’ incentives to be 
corrupt are higher in a market with more competitors. We find multiple 
equilibria where both corruption and pollution are either high or low. 
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1   Introduction 
According to Transparency International, corruption can be defined as “the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain” and can be classified into two broad categories – ‘grand’ 
corruption and ‘petty’ corruption. The former involves the exploitation of power by 
individuals in the higher ranks of public administration, e.g., the government, whereas the 
latter entails the exploitation of office by low- and mid-level public officials, e.g., the 
bureaucrats.1 By its very nature, corruption can infringe on a country’s social, economic as 
well as political domains, while its effects can be potentially far reaching. In this paper, we 
focus on an aspect whose relation with corruption has been receiving increased attention in 
recent years, mainly due to the current debate over climate change and the challenges that 
policy makers face in order to address it. This aspect is the quality of the natural 
environment. 
     On the outset, identifying a link between corruption and environmental quality seems to 
be straightforward. For example, grand corruption can determine the existence or the 
stringency of various environmental policies (such as pollution controls) whereas petty 
corruption can affect their effectiveness and implementation. Indeed, there is ample 
empirical support for these arguments. Fredriksson and Svensson (2003), Welsch (2004) and 
Cole (2007) provide cross-country evidence for the detrimental effect of corruption on the 
strictness of environmental regulations as well as their effectiveness. In her cross-country 
econometric study, Ivanova (2011) finds that even though countries with more effective 
environmental regulations report higher emissions, their actual emission levels are lower. 
This result is indicative of the fact that one of the consequences of corruption is that 
emissions tend to be significantly under-reported. Hubbard (1998) and Oliva (2012) employ 
empirical analyses to argue that the effectiveness of vehicle emission controls is significantly 
reduced as a result of corrupt activities in some inspection centres. Koyuncu and Yilmaz 
(2009) use a cross-country analysis to link corruption with deforestation, arguing that 
practices such as the under-declaration of the number of trees cut in public forests or the 
illegal sale of harvesting permits, have contributed significantly to the depletion of forest 
resources.2  
                                                 
1 http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/faqs_on_corruption#defineCorruption.  
2 A link between corruption and illegal logging is also established in Burgess et al. (2012).   
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     The aforementioned mechanisms identify what can be considered as the direct effect of 
corruption on the quality of the environment. Nevertheless, we can think of other indirect 
mechanisms through which corruption can impinge on the environment. For instance, 
consider GDP per capita. It is now widely accepted that corruption can be an unfavourable 
factor in the determination of a country’s per capita income (Mauro 1995; Aidt 2009); 
therefore it can affect pollution through its effect on GDP per capita, even for a given set of 
environmental regulations. Intuitively, this effect is opposite to the direct one that we 
described previously, because the adverse impact of corruption on income should mitigate 
the extent of environmental degradation – after all, pollution is, to a large extent, a by-
product of economic activity. Despite this fact, empirical evidence has shown that even after 
controlling for this indirect effect, the overall effect of corruption on pollutant emissions is 
positive. This is, for example, the outcome in the empirical investigation of Welsch (2004). 
In Cole (2007) the results are more ambiguous; yet the positive effect of corruption on 
pollution still materialises for the sub-sample of high income countries.3   
     Our paper seeks to promote our understanding of the issue by drawing attention to a 
previously unexplored indirect mechanism through which corruption impinges on 
environmental quality. This mechanism is related to market entry. We build a model where 
firms can produce goods using either a relatively dirty technology or a relatively clean one. 
Firms that employ the former are liable to an emission tax/penalty; firms that employ the 
latter are exempt from the tax, but have to incur the cost of its adoption. Bureaucrats are 
entrusted with the task of verifying the technology employed by firms and advise the 
government on the appropriate action, i.e., whether to impose the tax or not. Nevertheless, 
there is a moral hazard problem given that, in exchange for a bribe, bureaucrats may offer to 
firms that employ the dirty technology the opportunity of fabricating their true 
circumstances, thus misleading the government by advising against the imposition of the 
emission tax.  
     The characteristics of the model’s equilibrium are the following. On the one hand, 
corruption increases the number of entrants in the industry since the opportunity of bribing 
bureaucrats to avoid the tax burden associated with the use of the costless, but more 
                                                 
3 Another indirect mechanism on the corruption-pollution nexus is presented in Biswas et al. (2012). They find 
that corruption can affect environmental quality by increasing the activities of the shadow economy – the part 
of the economy whose activities cannot be regulated by environmental laws.   
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polluting, technology reduces the expected (fixed) operating costs. On the other hand, a 
larger number of competing firms increases the bureaucrats’ incentives to be corrupt, simply 
because a market with more firms offers a larger pool of potential bribe payers, thus 
increasing the expected benefits of being corrupt. Given these characteristics, the model 
generates multiple equilibria. Depending on parameter configurations, the equilibrium may 
be characterised by either a regime where bureaucrats are corrupt and more firms compete in 
the market, or a regime where none of the bureaucrats is corrupt and the market is 
comprised of fewer competitors. Furthermore, there is a possibility of equilibrium 
indeterminacy, as there are parameter configurations for which any of these two regimes 
represents a possible equilibrium outcome. On the whole, there are two distinct channels 
through which corruption can affect pollution. On the one hand, corruption increases the 
fraction of firms that use the relatively dirty technology – a direct effect that is corroborated 
by empirical evidence to which we alluded earlier. On the other hand, corruption increases 
the number of firms that compete in the market and produce output, thus increasing the 
amount of total emissions for given technology choices. This is an indirect effect that 
actually exacerbates the detrimental impact of corruption on environmental quality. It should 
be noted that the innovative aspect of our indirect channel, i.e., the positive effect of 
corruption on industry entry, finds empirical support in the recent study of Dreher and 
Gassebner (2013) who present evidence that corruption facilitates entry in economies where 
market activity is significantly regulated.  
     All in all, our model raises awareness to a previously unexplored mechanism that 
contributes to the understanding of the empirically-supported, positive relation between 
corruption and pollutant emissions.  In relation to the existing literature, our paper is closely 
connected to theoretical contributions that have introduced either grand or petty corruption 
(or both) into frameworks where environmental regulations call for emission reporting and 
monitoring (e.g., Acemoglu and Verdier 2000; López and Mitra 2000; Damania 2002; 
Damania et al. 2004).4 Despite the wealth of results and interesting implications emerging 
from these studies, the importance of market entry has eluded their attention as none of 
them have explicitly considered the repercussions of market structure in their analyses. Our 
                                                 
4 For theoretical contributions that introduce the possibility of emission under-reporting but abscond from the 
issue of corruption, see Harford (1987) and Malik (1993) among others.  
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contribution is that we clearly identify market entry as an important element in the relation 
between corruption and pollution.    
     The remainder of our analysis is organised as follows. In Section 2 we outline the 
characteristics of the market in which firms produce and supply their products. Section 3 
analyses the incentives for corruption by both firms and bureaucrats. In Section 4 we use the 
results of the previous section in order to identify the effect of corruption on pollution. 
Section 5 shows that the results remain the same even after the removal of one of the 
model’s restrictions regarding the relation between the cost of technology adoption and the 
environmental tax. In Section 6 we conclude.                                           
 
2   An Overview of the Market 
The purpose of this section is to present a brief overview of the characteristics that describe 
the demand and the supply side of our economic set-up. 
 
2.1   Demand 
Consider an economy where consumers purchase units of a homogeneous good that is 
supplied by imperfectly competitive firms. There is a mass of 0k   consumers, each one 
indexed by i . Each consumer decides whether to purchase one unit of the good or not. 
Consuming the good entails a utility of iu , a variable that is uniformly distributed across 
consumers over the interval [0, ]k  with density function 1( )if u k
 . Denoting the price of 
the homogeneous good by p , it follows that each consumer’s surplus is 
 i is u p  .  (1) 
     A consumer i  will purchase the good, if and only if the surplus associated with its 
consumption is non-negative, i.e., iff 0is  . Using (1), it is straightforward to establish that 
the consumers who will buy and consume units of the good are those consumers whose 
preferences satisfy [ , ]iu p k . Therefore, the fraction of consumers purchasing the good is 
equal to 
 ( )
k
i ip
k pf u du
k
 . (2) 
We can use Equation (2) to get the aggregate demand function  
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 k pQ k k p
k
   ,  (3) 
where Q  denotes the total demand for the product. The aggregate demand function is the 
sum of consumption expenditures by those consumers with non-negative surplus. Naturally, 
the demand is inversely related to the good’s price because a higher price supresses the 
number of potential consumers who can get a non-negative surplus from its consumption. 
In what follows, we will find useful to undertake the analysis in terms of the inverse demand 
function. Using (3), the inverse demand function can be written as      
 p k Q  .  (4) 
 
2.2   Supply 
Now let us consider the characteristics of the industry that supplies the good. Denote the 
number of firms that compete in the market by n . Each firm, indexed by j , produces and 
supplies jq  units of the good. Market clearing requires that 
1
n
j
j
Q q

  . Therefore, we can 
use Equation (4) to express a firm’s variable profit, denoted jv , according to  
 
1
n
j j j j
j
v k q q mq

      ,  (5) 
where 0m   is the per unit cost of production.5 Since the good supplied from the industry 
is homogeneous, it is useful to think of the firms as Cournot competitors that choose the 
quantity they produce in order to maximise their variable profit. Therefore6 
 
1
0 0
n
j
j j
jj
v
k q q m
q


        .  (6) 
     Combining the market clearing condition 
1
n
j
j
Q q

  with (4) and (6), it follows that the 
equilibrium is symmetric; that is, jq q
  j . Using (6), we get 
 
1
k mq
n
   .  (7) 
                                                 
5 We assume m k  so that each firm produces a strictly positive quantity of output (see Equation 7). 
6 It is can be easily checked that the sufficient condition for a maximum holds, i.e., 
2
2 2 0
j
i
v
q
    .  
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Given Q nq , we can substitute (7) in (4) to get  
 
1
k nmp
n
  .  (8) 
The equilibrium variable profit of a firm equals ( )v p m q  . Substituting Equations (7) and 
(8), we get    
 
2
1
k mv
n
     .  (9) 
     As expected, the firm’s variable profit is lower when the number of competitors in the 
market is higher. With a higher number of competitors, total supply (i.e., nq ) increases. For 
the market to clear, the price of the good has to fall in order to allow more consumers to 
enjoy a non-negative surplus from its consumption. The reduction in price has a detrimental 
effect on each firm’s variable profit.  
 
3   Environmental Tax, Corruption Incentives, and Entry 
There are two technologies available for each firm to choose.7 The relatively dirty technology 
emits 0e   pollutants per unit of production and can be adopted at zero cost. However, 
firms that employ this technology are liable to a lump-sum environmental tax/penalty, equal 
to 0t  . The relatively clean technology emits e e  pollutants per unit of production and 
its implementation relieves the firm from the obligation to pay the tax t . Nevertheless, its 
adoption is costly in the sense that it requires a fixed cost jc . This cost is random and 
realised only after firms make their decision to operate in the industry. It is also 
independently and identically distributed across firms. For simplicity, we consider a uniform 
distribution for jc . Specifically, jc  is distributed on the interval [0, ]x  with a probability 
density function 1( )jf c x
 .      
     The government cannot directly observe the technology of each firm. For this reason, it 
delegates this task to bureaucrats who monitor firms and verify the technology they employ. 
These officials are instructed to inform the government on the technology adopted by each 
                                                 
7 Other analyses of environmental regulation and emission reporting have employed the assumption of a binary 
technology choice. See, for example, Malik (1993).   
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firm and therefore advise on whether a tax should be imposed or not. We assume that the 
government hires δ  bureaucrats, where δ n , and offers a salary 0ω   to each of them, in 
exchange for his services. All firms will have their technology verified, i.e., each official will 
monitor nδ  firms.  
     The timing of the events that we consider is the following. In the first stage, potential 
entrants decide whether to incur the fixed cost of entry which allows them to compete in the 
industry. This fixed cost is equal to 0φ  . During the second stage, each firm chooses which 
technology to employ, a choice that is monitored and verified by a bureaucrat. We assume 
that bureaucrats are able to verify the actual choice of technology, i.e., firms cannot mislead 
them with regard to the technology they have adopted. However, as we shall see later, firms 
and bureaucrats may enter into an illegal agreement to conceal the true circumstances 
(regarding the technology choice) from the government. In the third stage, firms produce the 
goods that they supply in the market. As it is evident, the fixed nature of all the costs 
associated with entry (i.e., φ ) and technology choice (i.e., either the adoption cost or the 
environmental tax) means that the decision on how much to produce is not directly affected 
by the choice of technology.  
     We assume that the upper bound of the distribution of the adoption cost is high enough 
so that any effort to set the environmental tax to induce adoption of the clean technology 
whatever the realisation of jc  (i.e., when t x ) will deter entry for everyone. This outcome 
can be possible since firms make their entry decisions based on an expectation for jc  (recall 
that the actual cost is realised after entry takes place).8 Our current assumption seems to 
describe the more realistic scenario. The alternative assumption would imply that the 
government can entice every firm into the adoption of the less polluting technology, simply 
by setting the environmental tax arbitrarily high. Yet this outcome would be at odds with 
actual experience given that there are hardly any industries in which all firms operate the 
cleanest possible production methods. Despite these arguments, in Section 5 we relax this 
restriction and show that our results remain intact.       
                                                 
8 Formally, this may happen if 1
( / 2)
k m
φ x
  , a condition that we assume to hold. 
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     Now, let us consider a firm that has decided to operate in the market. During the second 
stage, the firm will adopt the clean technology as long as j jv c v t t c     . Given that 
t x  holds, a firm j  will be willing to use the clean technology, as long as  
 jc t .  (10) 
Given (10), firms which face [0, )jc t  will opt for the adoption of the clean technology (i.e., 
the one with emission rate e ) whereas firms who face [ , ]jc t x  will choose the more 
polluting technology (i.e., the one emitting e  pollutants per unit of output produced) and 
pay the environmental tax.  
     Now let us consider the choice of a firm which considers entry during the first stage. The 
expected profit is given by    
 
2 2
0
( )( ) ( )
2 2
t x
j j j j j jt
t t x t tπ v c f c dc t f c dc v v t v μ π
x x x
             ,  (11) 
where 
 (2 )
2
t x tμ
x
 .  (12) 
Potential entrants will wish to pay the fixed cost of entry and operate in the industry as long 
as π φ . Therefore, given 0jπ v
n n
    , the equilibrium number of firms will be 
determined by the zero profit condition π φ . Using (9) and (11), it follows that the 
equilibrium number of firms can be calculated as 
 1k mn φ μ
   .  (13) 
     The result in Equation (13) gives the equilibrium number of competitors in the scenario 
where both the parties that are involved in the choice and verification of the technology 
employed, i.e., firms and bureaucrats, behave honestly. Nevertheless, the delegation of 
monitoring to a third party generates a moral hazard issue that could lead to the following 
situation. Suppose that a bureaucrat would be willing to accept a bribe in order conceal the 
actual circumstances relevant to the technology choice of the firm he monitors. Particularly, 
by paying a bribe 0b   to the official, the firm can avoid paying the environmental tax 
despite the fact that it can choose not to incur the cost of adoption of a cleaner production 
method. Instead, the official who accepts the bribe will report that the firm employs the less 
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polluting production technology, while in reality this is not the case. Of course, the risk 
underlying this illegal collusion is that it may be eventually detected by the authorities. For 
the firm that is subsequently proven guilty of such misdemeanour, the penalty is that it will 
have to pay the environmental tax associated with the use of a dirty technology.  
     Now consider a firm that is monitored by an official who is corrupt in the sense that he is 
willing to accept the bribe. Furthermore, denote (0,1)σ   to be the probability that the 
authorities will eventually detect the fraudulent agreement between the firm and the official. 
The expected profit for the firm is  
 ( )v b σt  ,  (14) 
i.e., the amount that remains from the variable profits, after subtracting the bribe and the 
expected penalty in case the firm is apprehended. Of course, if the firm decides to adopt the 
clean technology, there is no need to pay the bribe and its profit will be jv c . It follows that 
a firm j  will be willing to adopt the less polluting technology, as long as  
 ˆjc b σt c   .  (15) 
Given (15), firms with ˆ[0, )jc c  will choose the clean technology, whereas firms with 
ˆ[ , ]jc c x  will choose the more polluting technology and bribe bureaucrats in order to 
deceive government authorities on their actual choice. Therefore, the number of firms which 
are willing to engage in a fraudulent collusion with a bureaucrat can be found from  
 
ˆ
ˆ ( )( )
x
j jc
x c x b σtn f c dc n n
x x
    .  (16) 
     As it is evident from (16), a higher bribe will reduce the number of firms that are willing 
to collude with the bureaucrat in concealing their true circumstances from the authorities. 
This is a quite intuitive result. A higher bribe will reduce the expected profit when the firm 
opts for adopting the dirty technology and bribes the corrupt official in order to mislead the 
government. As a result, more firms will find the adoption of the clean technology to be a 
more desirable option in terms of profitability.  
     Now consider a bureaucrat who contemplates his utility for the scenario where he 
engages in the type of fraudulent collusion that we described above. In addition to his salary 
ω , there is also the opportunity to earn illegal rents from the firms that are willing to bribe 
him in order to mislead the authorities. Recall that each bureaucrat will monitor nδ  firms. 
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Taking into account the previous analysis and discussion, the probability that a firm will be 
willing to offer him a bribe is 
ˆ
( )( )
x
j jc
x b σtf c dc
x
  . Furthermore, recall that the 
government will detect cases of fraudulent behaviour with probability σ . With regard to the 
bureaucrat, the penalty for such malfeasance is that he is dismissed without pay and he also 
loses all his ill-gotten gains. Given this discussion, the expected utility Cλ  of a corrupted 
official is  
 ( )( ; ) (1 )C x b σt nλ b n σ ω b
x δ
       .  (17) 
     Naturally, the bureaucrat will demand a bribe that maximises his expected utility. When 
deciding the bribe that he will ask in order to conceal the true characteristics of the firm he 
monitors, he will have to take account of two opposing effects on his expected utility. On 
the one hand, a higher bribe will directly increase the amount of ill-gotten gains. On the 
other hand, it will reduce the potential pool of firms out of which the official can extract 
illegal rents. This is because some of these firms will find it more advantageous to actually 
adopt the cleaner technology (thus having no need to bribe officials at all) if the bribe is too 
high. In addition to these considerations, note that the maximum bribe that a bureaucrat can 
demand is equal to (1 )σ t . Any bribe above this level would imply that those firms for 
which the adoption cost is too high to consider the implementation of the clean technology, 
would prefer to have their circumstances truthfully reported and subsequently pay the 
environmental tax, rather than paying the bureaucrat in order to conceal their information.          
     Let arg max ( ; )Cb λ b n  . We can use (17) and set ( ; ) 0
Cλ b n
b
  to obtain
9 
 
2
x σtb  .  (18) 
This result, combined with the preceding discussion, reveals that the optimal bribe is given 
by min{ ,(1 ) }b σ t  . In order to pin down the chosen bribe to a unique value, we are going 
to make a parametric assumption that will guarantee the interior solution for b . The details 
are summarised in  
 
                                                 
9 It is 
2
2
( ; ) 2 0
Cλ b n n
b xδ
   , meaning that the sufficient condition for a maximum holds. 
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Lemma 1. Assume that 
2
x t xσ    holds. Then the bribe that is optimal for a bureaucrat is given by 
b . 
 
Proof. It is sufficient to show that (1 )b σ t   . Using Equation (18), this condition is 
equivalent to  
 (1 )
2
x σt σ t      
 2(1 )x σ t σt      
 (2 )x σ t  ,  
which holds by assumption.   □  
 
     Let us discuss the characteristics of the result in (18). Firstly, the bribe is increasing in the 
upper bound of the distribution of technology adoption costs. The intuition is that x  
increases the expected cost of technology adoption, thus rendering bribery as a potentially 
more advantageous option for firms. Secondly, the bribe is decreasing in the environmental 
tax. Despite the fact that this effect seems counter-intuitive, it actually makes sense in this 
context. From a firm’s point of view, a higher tax increases the expected cost of being 
caught engaging in an illegal agreement with a bureaucrat. As we discussed earlier, firms that 
are eventually apprehended will be forced to pay the tax. This reduces the incentive to 
collude; therefore the bureaucrat can extract fewer rents from the potential agreement with 
the firm.10  
     Now, let us substitute (18) in (17) in order to write the expected utility of a corrupted 
official as  
 
2( )( ) (1 )
4
C x σt nλ n σ ω
x δ
     
.  (19) 
                                                 
10 Assuming that 
2
xt xσ   holds, would imply that the bribe demanded by the bureaucrat is equal to 
(1 )σ t . Indeed, this would maximise the expected utility of a bureaucrat, given that the firm’s participation 
constraint must be satisfied. Nevertheless, a look at (10) and (15) reveals that in this case, whether there is 
corruption or not will not have any implications for the number of firms that adopt the cleaner technology. 
Therefore equilibrium entry, aggregate production and (as we shall see in a latter section) pollution would be 
the same whether there is corruption among bureaucrats or not. As this is a trivial and uninteresting case, we 
rule it out by imposing the condition in Lemma 1.   
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Given the characteristics of our model, an official who decides to behave honestly will enjoy 
utility Hλ  equal to 
 Hλ ω ,  (20) 
i.e., he will not accept bribes from firms which may be willing to offer them and his income 
will be composed only of his salary. Of course, it is ultimately the choice of the bureaucrat 
whether to behave honestly or to take advantage of his position and seek to improve his 
income by means of bribe-taking. The decision will involve the comparison of the utilities in 
(19) and (20), a process that allows us to infer 
 
Lemma 2. There is a critical level nˆ  such that: 
i. For ˆn n , none of the bureaucrats is corrupt; 
ii. For ˆn n , all bureaucrats are potentially corrupt.  
 
Proof. Setting ( )H Cλ λ n  we get nˆ  such that 
 
2 ˆ( )(1 )
4
x σt nσ ω ω
x δ
      
  
 2
4ˆ
( ) (1 )
xσωδn
x σt σ   .  (21) 
Hence, the result of Lemma 1 follows from the fact that ( ) 0
Cλ n
n
   and 0
Hλ
n
   according 
to (19) and (20) respectively.   □    
 
     Among other factors, the number of firms that compete in the industry is a significant 
determinant of a bureaucrat’s decision on whether to be corrupt or honest. The intuition is 
as follows. From a bureaucrat’s point of view, a higher number of competitors will increase 
the pool of potential bribe payers. Consequently, his expected utility increases relative to the 
corresponding utility that he enjoys if he decides to behave honestly. In other words, a 
higher number of firms makes it more likely that the bureaucrat will ultimately seek to take 
advantage of his position and accept bribes in order to conceal information from the 
government.  
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     Now let us try to understand the implications of corruption for equilibrium entry. For a 
firm that contemplates entry during the first stage, the expected profit is   
 
2ˆ
ˆ0
ˆ ˆ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )
2
c x
j j j j j jc
c b σt x cπ v c f c dc b σt f c dc v
x x
         .  (22) 
Substitution of (15) in (22) yields  
 
2 2 2( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2 2j
b σt b σt b σtπ v b σt v b σt
x x x
           ,  (23) 
to which we can substitute (18) and derive                
 
2( ) 1
2 8 2 4j
x σt x σt x σt x σtπ v v v γ π
x x
               ,  (24) 
where 
 ( )(3 )
8
x σt x σtγ
x
  .  (25) 
Taking account of the fixed cost of entry, firms will have the incentive to operate in the 
industry as long as as π φ  holds. Once more, the equilibrium number of firms will be 
determined by π φ . Using (9) and (25), we can calculate equilibrium entry according to 
 1k mn φ γ
   .  (26) 
     The result in Equation (26) is analogous to Equation (13), the only difference being that 
now entry has been determined in an environment where bureaucrats are potentially corrupt, 
i.e., willing to accept bribes in order to mislead authorities on the actual implementation of 
technology by firms. A straightforward comparison between these two cases leads to  
 
Lemma 3. Equilibrium entry is higher in the presence of corruption among bureaucrats. That is, 
n n  . 
 
Proof. Inspection of (13) and (26) reveals that n n   holds, as long as γ μ . Indeed, we 
can use (12) and (25) to investigate the conditions for which   
 ( )(3 ) (2 )
8 2
x σt x σt t x t
x x
      
 2 2 23 2 ( ) 8 4x xσt σt xt t       
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 2 2 23 2 (4 ) (4 ) ( ) 0x xt σ t σ L t      ,  (27) 
holds. Taking the first and second derivatives of (27) with respect to t , we get 
2( ) 2 (4 ) 2 (4 )L t x σ t σ       and 2( ) 2(4 ) 0L t σ     respectively. By virtue of the 
conditions imposed in Lemma 1, the minimum possible tax satisfies 
2
xt σ  . Substituting 
this in (27) yields  
 
2 2
2 2 2
2 2
2(4 ) 43 3(2 ) 2(4 )(2 ) 4 0
2 (2 ) (2 )
σ σ xx σ σ σ σσ σ σ
                   
.  (28)  
Despite the fact that the derivative ( )L t  cannot be signed with certainty, the positive 
second derivative together with (28) imply that, as long as (27) holds for the maximum 
possible tax (that is t x ), then it must hold for any ,
2
xt xσ
    . This is because ( )L t  is 
U-shaped, thus it admits its highest possible values at the boundaries of the domain 
,
2
xt xσ
    . Substituting t x  in (27) we get 
2 2 2 23 2 (4 ) (4 )x x σ x σ      
 2 2( 1 2 )x σ σ      
 2 2( 1) 0x σ     (29)  
The preceding analysis shows that the expression in (27) holds as a strict inequality, thus 
completing the proof of the proposition.   □       
 
     The underlying intuition behind Lemma 3 is simple. Bureaucrats demand a bribe that will 
deter some firms from the implementation of the cleaner production method, simply 
because those firms find it less costly to bribe bureaucrats in order to conceal their actual 
choice of technology. In other words, the incidence of corruption offers opportunities that 
reduce the expected fixed costs of operating in the industry. As a result, the expected total 
profit increases, thus enticing more firms to compete in the market.   
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4   Pollution 
The purpose of this section is to gather all the results from the preceding analysis, and 
combine them in order to identify the implications of corruption for pollution. In this 
context, pollution corresponds to aggregate emissions, i.e., the total emissions resulting from 
the production activities of all the firms that supply the economy’s consumption good. On 
the outset, we expect corruption to affect pollution through two distinct mechanisms. 
Firstly, corruption affects total production, and therefore total emissions, through its impact 
on equilibrium entry. Secondly, corruption also affects the fraction of these competitors that 
actually opt for the adoption of the less polluting production process. With respect to the 
former effect, we can use the analysis of the previous section to derive 
 
Proposition 1. Consider the composite parameter terms k mr φ γ
  , 
k mz φ μ
   and 
2
2
4 ( ) (1 )
( ) (1 )
xσωδ x σt σα
x σt σ
     . Then, the following summarises all the possible equilibria in terms of 
corruption and entry:   
i. For r α , none of the bureaucrats is corrupt and equilibrium entry is characterised by n ;  
ii. For z α , all bureaucrats are potentially corrupt and equilibrium entry is characterised by n ;  
iii. For z α r   both cases where either none of the bureaucrats is corrupt and the number of firms is 
n , or all bureaucrats are potentially corrupt and the number of firms is n , are possible 
equilibria.  
 
Proof. Consider r α . By virtue of (21) and (26), this implies that ˆn n  . Given Lemmas 2 
and 3, an equilibrium with corruption cannot exist because, under all circumstances, 
equilibrium entry falls in the region where bureaucrats find it optimal to behave honestly. 
But then, the only possible solution for entry is given by (13), a result that is verified by the 
fact that, as long as ˆn n  , it is certainly true that ˆn n  . Now consider z α  which, by 
virtue of (13) and (21), implies that ˆn n  . In this case, we can allude to Lemmas 2 and 3 in 
order to establish that an equilibrium without corruption does not exist. This is because 
under all circumstances, equilibrium entry falls in the region where bureaucrats find it 
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optimal to be corrupt when such opportunity is given to them. But then, the only possible 
solution for entry is given in Equation (26). Indeed, this conjecture is verified by the fact 
that, as long as ˆn n  , then it is certainly true that ˆn n  . Finally, the previous discussion 
reveals that, insofar as z α r   holds, we cannot find an argument that will pin down a 
unique equilibrium. Instead, both scenarios represent a possible equilibrium outcome, 
because ˆn n   is consistent with an equilibrium where no bureaucrat is corrupt while, at the 
same time, ˆn n   is also consistent with an equilibrium where officials will be corrupt, 
whenever such opportunity arises.   □     
 
     The interpretation of these results is the following. When structural parameters are 
conducive to a situation where bureaucrats will certainly refuse any offer of a bribe, potential 
entrants know that they will not be able to mislead authorities in a way that will allow them 
to avoid paying the environmental tax, despite their use of a more polluting, but costless, 
technology. Nevertheless, when structural parameters guarantee that bureaucrats will be 
willing to accept bribes when such prospect arises, potential entrants see this as an 
opportunity of greater profitability, simply because they know that the expected cost of 
technology choice is lower. It is the expectation of higher expected profits that entices a 
potentially higher number of competitors in the industry. Indeterminacy emerges under 
parameter configurations that generate a case of self-fulfilling prophecies. If potential 
entrants expect that bureaucrats will (will not) accept bribes, the resulting entry in the 
industry will be sufficient to motivate bureaucrats to seek (not to seek) illegal rents through 
bribery, thus verifying the initial expectation.    
     Next, we delve into the implications of corruption for technology choice. Let us denote 
the fraction of firms choosing the relatively dirty technology by θ , meaning that 1 θ  is the 
fraction of firms adopting the less polluting technology. We begin with the case where there 
is no corruption among bureaucrats, for which we can use (10) to obtain these fractions as  
 
0
( )  and 1  ( )x tj j j jt
x t tθ f c dc θ f c dc
x x
       .  (30) 
If we use (15) and (18), we can derive the corresponding shares in the scenario where 
bureaucrats are potentially corrupt. That is, 
 
ˆ
ˆ 0
( )  and 1 )
2 2
  (x cj j j jc
x σt x σtθ f c dc θ f c dc
x x
        .  (31) 
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These results allow us to derive 
 
Lemma 4. Corruption reduces the fraction of competing firms that adopt the less polluting technology, i.e., 
θ θ  . 
 
Proof. Using (30) and (31), it can be easily checked that θ θ   holds, as long as 
2
xt σ  . 
This condition applies by virtue of Lemma 1.   □  
 
     Denote pollution by S . As we indicated earlier, pollution corresponds to the emissions 
resulting from the production activities of all competing firms in the market. Formally, 
 (1 ) [ (1 ) ]S θnqe θ nq e Q θe θ e      ,  (32) 
where Q nq . Using the implications from the preceding analysis, our next result comes in 
the form of 
 
Proposition 2. Corruption is associated with greater pollution. 
 
Proof. We can use Equation (7) to write aggregate production as ( )
1
n k mQ
n
  , an expression 
for which we can check that 0Q
n
   holds. Furthermore, we can use (32) to establish that 
0S
Q
   and ( ) 0
S Q e eθ
    . Thus, we can allude to the results of Lemmas 3 and 4 in 
order to establish that corruption leads to higher pollution.   □ 
 
     Corruption increases pollution through two distinct mechanisms. Firstly, it attracts more 
firms in the industry, thus increasing aggregate production for a given emission rate. 
Secondly, it increases the fraction of firms that employ a more polluting technology, thus 
increasing emissions for a given level of production. Since both mechanisms work towards 
the same direction, the overall effect is an unambiguous increase in pollution.   
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5   The Corruption-Pollution Nexus when t x   
The purpose of this section is to show that our results remain qualitatively identical when the 
restriction t x  is relaxed. Although we view this as a less realistic case, we present its 
corresponding implications for reasons of concreteness. Firstly, let us begin with the case 
where bureaucrats and firms behave honestly. Naturally, the condition t x  implies that all 
potential entrants will choose to adopt the technology with the relatively low emission rate 
e . This is because the payment of the environmental tax is always the more costly option, 
whatever the realised cost of implementing the clean technology. In this case, the restriction 
in Footnote 7 does not hold anymore. Instead, the equilibrium market entry in the absence 
of corruption is11   
 * 1
( / 2)
k mn φ x
  .  (33) 
     Now let us consider the case where corruption is an equilibrium phenomenon in the 
sense that bureaucrats are seeking bribes in order to conceal the actual circumstances of 
firms which are willing to offer them. Although all firms would be willing to adopt the 
cleaner technology in the absence of corruption, the opportunity offered by corrupt 
bureaucrats allow some of them to use the costless, more polluting technology while 
claiming to do otherwise. It is straightforward to verify that the analysis and results 
summarised in Equations (14)-(26) are the same. The only difference is that the restriction 
/t x σ  is required to make the story non-trivial. If this condition does not hold, then all 
firms will choose not to pay bribes as adopting the cleaner production technology is a less 
costly option – a conjecture that is evident from Equations (15) and (18). Hence we can 
assume that  /x t x σ   holds.  
     The previous discussion reveals that the implication of Lemma 4 still applies, simply 
because all firms will adopt the clean technology in the absence of corruption, i.e., * 0θ  , 
contrary to what happens in the presence of corruption where a fraction 
ˆ
( )
2
  x j jc
x σtθ f c dc
x
    of firms will employ the high-emission technology and bribe 
bureaucrats to misreport their true circumstances. In order for Proposition 2 to remain 
                                                 
11 This result can be easily established once we set 
0
( )
2
x
j j j
xπ v c f c dc v     equal to φ . 
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intact, it is sufficient to show that ** *n n  holds as well. Alternatively, it is sufficient to show 
that   
 ( )(3 )
8 2
x σt x σt x
x
      
 2 2 23 2 ( ) 4x xσt σt x      
 2 22 ( ) 0xσt σt x   ,  (34) 
 holds. Notice that (34) can be written as 2( )x σt   which is unambiguously negative. 
Therefore, it is indeed true that ** *n n .          
 
6   Conclusion 
Existing empirical evidence shows that corruption is among the factors that are responsible 
for higher pollution. The increased awareness on environmental issues, such as climate 
change, and the efforts by nations around the world to take collective action in order to 
address them is indicative of the importance that should be attached to the understanding of 
the possible mechanisms behind this relation. Such knowledge may facilitate economists and 
policy makers in their attempts to recognise the conditions that determine the effectiveness 
of environmental regulations and policies, especially in developing countries where the 
problem of corruption appears to be more salient and persistent.  
     The main purpose of our paper was to identify a previously unexplored channel through 
which the incidence of corruption impinges on total emissions. This mechanism is associated 
with market entry. Particularly, we have shown the possibility of a self-reinforcing cycle, 
whereby corruption leads to an increase of the number of (polluting) firms that compete in 
the market, whereas the same increase in market entry raises the incentives of bureaucrats to 
engage in corrupt activities. These two-way causal effects lead to multiple equilibria. One of 
these equilibria is characterised by the presence of corruption and relatively high pollution; 
the other regime is characterised by the absence of corruption and relatively low pollution. 
The incidence of corruption impinges on environmental quality through two distinct 
mechanisms. Firstly, it increases the number of firms that undertake (polluting) production. 
Secondly, it increases the fraction of firms that employ the technology which releases more 
emissions per unit of production.  
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     Despite the obvious policy component of our framework, our analysis and discussion are 
positive rather than normative. Our purpose was to illustrate additional economic and 
environmental implications that may arise due to the moral hazard issues generated by the 
implementation of a specific environmental policy. We did not make any attempt to suggest 
mechanisms that will improve the effectiveness of environmental policy since this is an issue 
that goes beyond the scope of our current analysis. Nevertheless, issues of mechanism 
design in the effort to reduce corruption and increase the effectiveness of environmental 
policy are indubitably important; thus, they certainly represent a worth pursuing avenue for 
future research. 
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